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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, : 
DIANE MARIE NELSON, : Case No. 970163-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered December 13, 1996 for Aggravated Robbery, a 
first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
failing to make findings of fact or conclusions of law on 
Appellant's motion to suppress the eyewitness identification on 
the ground that it was unreliable pursuant to Article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: If factual issues are presented to 
and must be resolved by the trial court, but no findings of fact 
appear in the record, the reviewing court will "assume that the 
trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, and [will] 
affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable 
to find facts to support it." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1224 (Utah 1997). If this assumption is unreasonable, a remand 
for a new trial is required. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved at 
R. 17, 161-69. 
ISSUE II; Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction of aggravated robbery? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will reverse a criminal 
case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved at 
R. 374-375. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules is included in Addendum A of this Brief: 
The Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995); 
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 4, 1996, Diane Nelson ("Appellant" or 
"Diane") was convicted by a jury of Aggravated Robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 
2 
1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I, for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie Lewis presiding. Judgment 
was entered December 13, 1996. On December 26, 1996, a Notice of 
Appeal was filed in the Utah Supreme Court. On February 24, 
1997, the Utah Supreme Court poured over the case to this Court 
for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 1, 1996, Amy Brown ("Mrs. Brown") had been 
driving around Salt Lake City to "cool off" after having a 
dispute with her roommates. R. 290, 309-10. At approximately 
9:50 to 10:00 p.m., she went back to her apartment at 263 Delmar 
Court. Delmar runs northbound from 300 South and is located 
about a block from Pioneer Park between 300 West and 200 West. 
R. 289, 335. Mrs. Brown parked her truck a few feet from her 
apartment and began to walk home. R. 311. It was dark, but not 
pitch black. R. 311, 294, 328. Though there are street lights 
in that area, only one or two lights were lit. R. 294. Where 
Mrs. Brown lives there are garages on one side and apartments on 
the other, and no lighting. R. 294. Because the neighborhood is 
a high crime area, and it was after dark, Mrs. Brown was trying 
to get from her truck to the apartment as quickly as she could. 
R. 325-26. As she walked, she saw two men and a woman standing 
by a dumpster. R. 312. Mrs. Brown ignored the people as she 
continued walking to her apartment. R. 136. Mrs. Brown heard 
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the woman say, "Nice shoes." R. 314. Mrs. Brown did not stop, 
but ignored the woman and continued walking. R. 313, 314, 325. 
Mrs. Brown said the woman then turned to one of the men and said, 
"I like her shoes." R. 314. Mrs. Brown ignored her and 
continued walking. R. 314. Mrs. Brown looked out of the corner 
of her eye at the people as she walked by. R. 326. She paid 
more attention to the two men than she did the woman. R. 323. 
Mrs. Brown heard the woman say the man's name and then say, "Get 
them for me." R. 314. Mrs. Brown testified that at that point 
she was terrified. The man, who was about three feet from the 
woman and about four feet from Mrs. Brown, pulled a knife from 
behind his back and pointed it toward her. R. 314-15. At that 
point, Mrs. Brown's attention was focused on the man with the 
knife and the weapon. R. 327. At some point, the man told 
Mrs. Brown to "give her the shoes." R. 329. Mrs. Brown began 
running away from the people to her apartment. R. 316, 328. She 
did not look back. R. 328. The man followed but did not chase 
her up the alley. Instead, he turned toward Pioneer Park. 
R. 318. 
The woman did not say anything after the man came near 
Mrs. Brown with the knife. R. 317. The woman did not have the 
knife, touch the knife, or hand a knife to anyone. The woman did 
not say anything about the knife. R. 327-28. The woman did not 
chase her. R. 328. She did not say anything else to the man, or 
encourage or assist him in any other way. R. 329. By the time 
Mrs. Brown got to her apartment, she was hysterical. R. 291, 
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298, 319, 339, 344. Mrs. Brown called the police. R. 291. The 
police arrived about 15 to 20 minutes later. R. 296-97. 
According to Officer DeGraw's ("DeGraw") report, 
Mrs. Brown described the woman as black, with curly black hair, 
five feet, six inches tall. R. 348-49. Despite Mrs. Brown's 
belief that she had no difficulty seeing, she gave DeGraw no 
description of the woman's shirt, pants, shoes, body shape, 
weight, length of hair, or eye color. R. 332-33, 350. After 
getting a description of the people from Mrs. Brown, the police 
left to search the area. R. 297. 
About 3 0 to 4 0 minutes after Mrs. Brown made the call, 
the police returned asking Mrs. Brown to identify a woman. 
R. 298, 302, 319-20. Mrs. Brown was so hysterical it took her 
husband a couple of minutes to coax her off the couch and outside 
with the police. R. 298. By then, it was completely dark. 
R. 331. Mrs. Brown said the police took her down the front alley 
where she saw Appellant, Diane Nelson, handcuffed by a police 
car. R. 321. Mrs. Brown's husband, Ray Brown ("Brown"), was 
with her. R. 302-303. Brown also testified that Diane was 
handcuffed. R. 3 03. No one else was presented for 
identification other than Diane. R. 304, 354. Officer Boelter 
was standing by Diane. R. 354. The police shined a flashlight 
in Diane's face. R. 298. Mrs. Brown was about fifteen feet 
away. R. 354. Mrs. Brown became "hysterical," telling the 
police that Diane was the woman by the dumpster. R. 298. 
Diane had been taken into custody as she walked out of an 
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alley east of Delmar Court, just north of the dumpster. She was 
very emotional, stating that she had not done anything. R. 343. 
DeGraw testified that Diane told him, "Maybe Cody or Brad did 
something, but I didn't do anything." R. 345. She had no 
weapon. R. 351. 
Mrs. Brown testified that she ignored the people by the 
dumpster throughout most of the incident. R. 313, 314, 324, 325, 
327. Mrs. Brown believed the entire incident lasted less than 
thirty seconds. R. 328. At trial, Mrs. Brown testified that the 
woman by the dumpster was "nicely dressed" and "not wearing 
shorts or anything like that" but had "pants and a shirt on. At 
the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Brown testified that she could not 
recall what the woman was wearing, only what one of the men was 
wearing because she was looking more closely at the men than she 
was the woman. R. 323. Mrs. Brown testified that the woman by 
the dumpster was slightly taller than herself. R. 329. 
Mrs. Brown told the police the woman was five-feet six-inches 
tall. R. 160-61. Diane is five-feet two-inches tall, two inches 
shorter than Mrs. Brown. R. 349. Mrs. Brown testified that the 
knife was a large hunting knife, eighteen inches to two feet 
long. R. 315. In Officer DeGraw7s report, Mrs. Brown described 
the knife as a large pocket knife. R. 347. Delmar Court is 
close to Pioneer Park, a well known high crime area. R. 335. 
Many low income and homeless people frequent the area, milling 
about and congregating on street corners. Delmar Court is also 
near the Broadway and LeFrance Hotels. There are a number of 
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low-income, African American and Hispanic people living in those 
hotels. R. 300-301, 325-26, 351-52. 
Dr. Dodd, a professor of psychology with the University 
of Utah and expert in eyewitness identification, testified on 
behalf of Diane. Dr. Dodd testified that identification involves 
three stages — acquisition, retention and recall. R. 385. 
Because attention is selective, what a person notices and 
remembers may be inaccurate. R. 384. Acquisition is the most 
critical stage. R. 386. Factors that affect acquisition include 
the ability to perceive and whether the person is paying 
attention. R. 3 86. People who are anxious or stressed are 
likely to have poorer abilities to acquire information. R. 3 89. 
The greater the stress, the poorer the performance in all 
cognitive activities. R. 389. The longer the time for 
observation, the more likely the witness will remember what she 
has seen. R. 390. It takes a considerable amount of time to 
take up enough information to remember a new face. R. 402. It 
is very unlikely that 10 to 15 seconds of observation is 
sufficient to remember a new face. R. 403. Witnesses, however, 
tend to remember fast-moving, stressful events as taking longer 
than they in fact did, typically exaggerating the duration of 
time by anywhere from two to four times. R. 390-91. Dr. Dodd 
testified that walking past a dumpster was a very brief period of 
time in which to see three faces. 391-92. If the witness 
focuses on one person, she is less likely to focus on the others. 
R. 391-92. If a weapon is involved, the witness is more likely 
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to focus on the weapon and not the perpetrator's face. 
R. 406-07. 
The reliability of an eyewitness identification is not 
measured by the honesty or level of certainty of the witness. 
R. 388. While height estimates are not typically very accurate, 
it is easy for most witnesses to determine if the person was 
taller or shorter than themselves. R. 392. Cross-racial 
identifications are more unreliable. R. 3 93. 
Retrieval can be influenced by suggestions one picks up 
from the environment. R. 386. Suggestions can be in the form of 
a question that suggests a new piece of information about events 
or a characteristic of the face of the person. R. 3 94. A 
witness's memory is especially vulnerable to suggestion if the 
original acquisition is weak. R. 395. Any suggestion by law 
enforcement that they have the right person is likely to lead to 
retrieval of misinformation. R. 396. Showups are by nature 
extremely suggestive because they convey a strong suggestion that 
the police have the right person. R. 3 97. Dr. Dodd testified 
that there are many experts, British and American, who maintain 
that showups are such suggestive procedures that they should not 
be used at all. R. 413. The witness is more likely to be 
influenced by suggestion when the witness is motivated to see 
that the wrongdoer is apprehended. R. 3 97. 
The fact that the witness did not identify another 
individual in a subsequent showup is not significant without 
knowing how similar the individual was to the original 
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participant. R. 411. 
Dr. Dodd testified that given all the factors of this 
case, the brief time period for observation, the darkness, 
stress, and cross-racial identification, among others, there was 
a "strong likelihood that the person who saw the perpetrator 
could not identify them later, even several minutes later." 
R. 398. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the 
eyewitness identification on the grounds that the showup was 
prejudicially suggestive and the identification unreliable under 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The trial court 
refused to address the reliability of the identification under 
the factors laid out in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991), but instead let the issue go the jury. The trial court's 
failure to make the necessary legal and factual findings to 
determine as a constitutional matter whether the identification 
is sufficiently reliable under Article I, section 7 constitutes 
reversible error. There are unresolved factual conflicts and 
inconsistencies in the evidence material to the admissibility of 
the eyewitness identification. Absent the eyewitness 
identification, the State has no case against Appellant. The 
remedy for the trial court's failure to make the necessary legal 
and factual determinations is a remand for a new trial. 
The State presented insufficient evidence to support a 
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conviction of Aggravated Robbery. In order to convict Appellant 
as an accomplice to Aggravated Robbery, the State must prove that 
she knew that the principal would use a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of the offense. The State failed to present any 
evidence to support this conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL 
DETERMINATIONS REGARDING APPELLANTS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
When the reliability of an eyewitness identification is 
challenged under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
the trial court must determine whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the identification was reliable. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). The trial court's 
failure to make a preliminary determination of the reliability of 
an eyewitness identification is reversible error and a new trial 
is warranted. Id. at 787-88.1 
It has long been recognized that the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification can be affected by a range of factors 
such as the race of the individuals or suggestive identification 
procedures. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986). 
1
. Appellant also challenges the admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Because the analysis under Article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution is "as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis" required under Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), 
Appellant has focused his analysis on the state constitutional 
claim. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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Research has shown popular notions regarding eyewitness 
identifications are often untrue. For example, the confidence of 
the individual making the identification is not a reliable 
indicator of the accuracy of his or her memory. Xd. It is a 
common misconception that a victim of a crime will have a greater 
ability to recall details because of the significance of the 
event. But research has long shown that when people are under 
stress, their ability to acquire information is diminished. Id. 
at 488-89, R. 389. 
Despite the acknowledged frailties of eyewitness 
identifications, jurors still give such testimony a great deal of 
weight. Long, 721 P.2d at 490. One study involving a simulated 
criminal trial showed that even when "presented with an 
eyewitness who was quite thoroughly discredited by counsel," 68% 
of the jurors still voted to convict. .Id. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in recognition of the fact that the "annals of criminal 
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification," has 
fashioned a rigorous analysis testing the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications under Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). 
In fashioning this analysis under the Utah Constitution, 
the Court stated: 
Of central importance is the burden that rests on 
the prosecution and the distinction between the 
role of the judge, as the arbiter of the 
constitutional admissibility of an 
identification, and the role of the jury, as the 
ultimate finder of fact. A failure to keep this 
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burden and this distinction in mind can fatally 
flaw any conviction obtained through the 
admissibility of any eyewitness identification. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. The burden is on the prosecution to 
demonstrate the admissibility of the eyewitness identification. 
Id. "The defendant then is entitled to a determination by the 
court of the evidence's constitutional admissibility." .Id. at 
778. In making that determination, the trial court must resolve 
certain factual issues. Many of those same factual issues will 
also be addressed by the jury when it determines the credibility 
of the evidence, if admitted. Jd. For example, the court will 
have to resolve certain factual matters such as whether the 
witness had a sufficient opportunity to perceive the perpetrator 
in order to determine whether, as a constitutional matter, the 
evidence meets the threshold requirement of reliability. If the 
evidence is admitted, the jury will also have to decide the issue 
again in determining the weight to give the evidence. Id. 
Potential for role confusion and for erosion of 
constitutional guarantees inheres in this overlap 
of responsibility of judge and jury to determine 
the same issue. Because the jury is not bound by 
the judge's preliminary factual determination 
made in ruling on admissibility, the trial court 
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as 
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered 
evidence for constitutional defects and may 
simply admit the evidence, leaving all questions 
pertinent to its reliability to the jury. But 
courts cannot properly sidestep their 
responsibility to perform the required 
constitutional admissibility analysis. To do so 
would leave protection of constitutional rights 
to the whim of a jury and would abandon the 
courts' responsibility to apply the law. The 
danger of such an abdication of responsibility is 
particularly serious where the admissibility of 
an eyewitness identification is concerned because 
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of the probability that such evidence even though 
thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a 
jury. 
Id. at 778-79 (citations omitted). 
The trial court, in this case, succumbed to the very 
temptation of which Ramirez gives warning. The court abdicated 
its role as the gatekeeper and guardian of constitutional 
protections and refused without review of the facts to fairly 
determine the necessary issues. Prior to trial, defense counsel 
filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification in this 
case on the grounds that it was not reliable under Article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. R. 17. At the motion to 
suppress hearing, defense counsel indicated that it was his 
understanding that the State intended to submit the preliminary 
hearing transcript. Defense counsel indicated that he intended 
to also rely on portions of the preliminary hearing transcript 
and the testimony of Dr. Dodd. R. 161-62. The trial court then 
stated: 
And frankly, 111 be honest with you [defense 
counsel], unless there's something highly 
unusual, here, it's an issue of fact as to 
whether or not the eye witness is reliable. 
Dr. Dodd can certainly say what he thinks, but 
he's not the finder of fact, the jury would be. 
So what I'd be inclined to do is let it go to the 
jury, and not suppress the identification, give 
the Long instruction, let Dr. Dodd testify, let 
the state call an expert if they wish to. 
R. 162-63. 
After some discussion about discovery and notice of the 
use of an expert witness, the court stated: 
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Assuming foundation can be laid consistent with 
the curriculum vitae, I would allow the witness 
to be called at trial to testify to the general 
unreliability, or the factors that lead to 
unreliability in eyewitness testimony. Given my 
ruling, I don't think you can gain anything by 
putting him on, [defense counsel]. I guess [the 
State] has the option of calling him if he wishes 
to. 
R. 167-68. 
Defense counsel indicated that the purpose of his motion 
to suppress was to ask the trial court to determine as a matter 
of law, prior to trial, the reliability of the identification. 
R. 168. Counsel then made a proffer as to some of the subject 
matters Dr. Dodd would have testified about. The court responded 
by denying the motion without having heard any evidence, or 
making any findings of fact, instead relying on the jury to 
determine the reliability of the identification. 
Trial Court: Right. And again, either side can 
argue this with or without testimony. But absent 
any further information that persuades me, I'm 
inclined to allow the identification to stand, to 
deny the motion to suppress, but to instruct the 
jury fully on the issue of eyewitness 
identification pursuant to Long, to allow the 
State to call a witness on eyewitness 
identification of their own if they wish to. 
R. 169. 
It is clear from the above statements that the trial 
court erroneously believed that the reliability of the eyewitness 
identification was an issue of fact for the jury, and not for the 
trial court. The State never submitted the preliminary hearing 
transcripts or any other evidence in support of its burden of 
establishing the reliability of the identification. The court 
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apparently believed that instructing the jury on the factors 
articulated in Long for assessing the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification was sufficient to protect Appellant's 
due process rights under the Utah Constitution. This assumption 
was incorrect. Ramirez requires the trial court apply the 
factors articulated in Loner to determine as a constitutional 
matter whether the identification is sufficiently reliable. The 
Long factors are as follows: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree 
of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factors as whether 
the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the 
observer during the time it was observed, and 
whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The 
trial court made no attempt to apply the factors articulated in 
Ramirez to the facts of this case, or resolve any factual 
disputes. 
Generally, when factual issues must be resolved by the 
trial court but no findings of fact can be found in the record, 
the reviewing court will assume that the trial court found them 
in accord with its decision, and will affirm the decision if the 
evidence reasonably supports the court's ruling. There are some 
cases where that assumption is inappropriate. State v. 
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Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224-25 (Utah 1997); Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 787. A remand for a new trial is required in cases where 
there are conflicts in the evidence critical to the issues 
raised. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787. 
In Ramirez, the trial court did not rule on a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal 
seizure, but refrained from passing on the issue letting the 
evidence go to the jury instead. R. Xd. at 786. That evidence 
included the eyewitness identification. Ld. The Ramirez court 
held, "[T]he trial court bears the responsibility to resolve 
preliminary constitutional issues as to the admissibility of 
evidence, and it cannot abdicate this responsibility by de facto 
leaving the question to the jury." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787. 
The court also noted that Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure required the court make findings of fact on 
the record. Id. at 787. Because there were conflicts in the 
evidence material to the suppression motion, the Ramirez court 
could not assume that findings had been made. id. at 788. Most 
troubling to the court was the fact that these conflicts existed 
among the State's own witnesses. Id. at 787. One critical 
factual issue left unanswered by the trial court was whether 
Ramirez was handcuffed prior to the officers receiving 
information about the crime. Id. at 787. 
Having determined that the trial court had not committed 
a "mere technical oversight," but had failed to "address the 
factual questions and to make the legal determinations that were 
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a prerequisite to the admission of the eyewitness identification 
essential to the conviction," the court turned to the issue of an 
appropriate remedy. Id. at 788. The court vacated the 
conviction and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. 
The Ramirez court reasoned: 
To asked the trial court to address the 
admissibility question now would be to tempt it 
to reach a post hoc rationalization for the 
admission of this pivotal evidence. Such a mode 
of proceeding holds too much potential for abuse. 
The only fair way to proceed is to vacate 
defendant's conviction and remand the matter for 
retrial. This will permit a trial judge to 
address properly the constitutional admissibility 
question and enter appropriate findings and 
conclusions. 
Id. at 789. 
It would be unreasonable to assume that the court in this 
case made any factual findings in light of the fact that the 
court indicated from the outset its belief that the reliability 
of the identification was a matter for the jury. Subsequently, 
the court never reviewed any of facts of the case and indicated a 
marked unwillingness to do so. The trial court failed to address 
the issues presented to it in any meaningful way. This is not 
simply a case where the court made a reasoned ruling but failed 
to make specific findings of fact to support it. In this case, 
the trial court never considered the critical issue of whether 
the identification met the threshold level of reliability 
required by Article I, section 7. 
Indeed, as in Ramirez, a review of the trial transcripts 
reveal a number of conflicts in the evidence critical to the 
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determination of the admissibility of the identification. These 
factual issues are central to the issue of the reliability of the 
identification. For example, it was unclear how dark it was at 
the time of the incident or how well lit the area was. 
Mrs. Brown testified that at 9:50 or 10:00 p.m., it was almost 
dark, but that there were street lights along the sidewalk. 
R. 311-12. Her husband testified that it was "pretty dark," but 
that some of the street lights were out so that only one or two 
lights were working. R. 294. It was unclear whether the working 
lights were near the dumpsters. Mrs. Brown's husband also 
testified that the dumpsters were located on the alley near Third 
South. R. 295. He indicated that in the area near Third South 
there is no lighting. R. 294-95. Officer DeGraw testified that 
it is not a well lit area. R. 338. Perhaps the most troubling 
conflict in the evidence left unresolved by the trial court 
involves the issue of whether Appellant was handcuffed during the 
showup. Officer DeGraw claimed that Appellant was not handcuffed 
during the showup. R. 354. However, his testimony was 
contradicted by the State's other witnesses. Mrs. Brown 
testified that Appellant was handcuffed. R. 321. Her husband 
also testified that Appellant was handcuffed during the showup. 
R. 303. The resolution of this factual issue is critical to a 
fair and reasoned determination of the reliability of the 
eyewitness identification. 
In Ramirez, the defendant was handcuffed to a fence, he 
was the only suspect presented for identification, lights were 
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shined in his face, and he was surrounded by police. 817 P.2d at 
777. The court stated that the showup was blatantly suggestive. 
Likewise, in State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), the defendant was standing on the porch of his apartment. 
He, too, was alone save for several police officers standing near 
him while the patrol car lights were shined into his face. The 
court held that the trial court's finding that the showup was not 
blatantly suggestive was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1238. 
The showup in this case is likewise prejudicially 
suggestive. Appellant was the only suspect presented for 
identification. R. 304, 354. It was dark. R. 331. She was 
standing by a police car with Officer Boelter by her side. 
R. 321, 354. The police shined a flashlight in her face. 
R. 298. If Appellant were also handcuffed, the prejudicial 
impact of this already blatantly suggestive showup is heightened. 
Most people associate the use of handcuffs with an arrest. And 
most people would assume that the police would arrest someone 
only if they believed he or she had committed a crime. Most 
importantly, people tend to have confidence in the police and 
their judgment in such matters, so the suggestion that the right 
person has been found is even stronger. If Appellant were 
handcuffed, the clear implication would be that the police had 
already arrested her because they believed they had the right 
person. Given the fact that the circumstances surrounding the 
incident call into serious question the reliability of the 
identification, this cannot be ignored and left unresolved. 
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Looking at the evidence presented at trial, the record does not 
clearly support a ruling that the eyewitness identification was 
reliable. The incident took place in the length of time it took 
Mrs. Brown to walk past the three people by the dumpster. She 
was trying to get to her apartment as quickly as possible. 
R. 325-26. Mrs. Brown estimated the incident lasted less than 
thirty seconds. R. 328. But, it must be remembered that 
according to Dr. Dodd, people tend to exaggerate the duration of 
a stressful and fast moving event. R. 3 90-91. Dr. Dodd 
testified that it was very unlikely that 10 to 15 seconds of 
observation was sufficient to remember a new face. R. 403. 
Mrs. Brown testified no less than five times at trial that she 
ignored the people by the dumpster as she walked by them. 
R. 313, 314, 324-25, 327. Mrs. Brown admitted that she paid more 
attention to the two men than she did the woman. R. 323. She 
testified that she looked out of the corner of her eye at the 
people as she walked by them. R. 326. At the point in time that 
the man pulled out the knife, her focus was on him and the 
weapon, not the woman. R. 327. Then she ran and did not look 
back. R. 328. 
The lighting was poor at best. R. 294, 311, 325-26, 328. 
Mrs. Brown was completely hysterical after the incident and 
during the showup. R. 291, 298, 319, 339, 344. Though 
Mrs. Brown testified that she identified Appellant at the showup 
based on her face and clothing, Mrs. Brown apparently gave 
Officer DeGraw no description of the woman's clothing immediately 
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after the incident. R. 321, 332-33. Mrs. Brown admitted that at 
the preliminary hearing, she stated that she could not remember 
what the woman was wearing because she paid more attention to the 
two men. R. 323. Mrs. Brown testified at trial that the woman 
was taller than herself. R. 329. She told Officer DeGraw 
immediately after the incident that the woman was five-foot six-
inches tall, two inches taller than herself. R. 348-49. 
Appellant is two inches shorter than Mrs. Brown. R. 349. The 
most troubling aspect of the identification in this case is the 
fact that the eyewitness is Caucasian and Appellant is African 
American. R. 393. It is a well documented fact that cross-
racial identifications tend to be less accurate. Long, 721 P.2d 
at 489. In conjunction with the blatantly suggestive showup 
procedure, the reliability of the identification in this case is 
highly questionable even if Appellant were not handcuffed during 
the showup. If she were handcuffed, the prejudicial impact of 
the showup undermines the reliability of the identification even 
further. 
This case is distinguishable from other cases where 
despite a suggestive showup, the court has found that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. 
Ramirez is the leading case in this area. Ramirez was described 
by the court as "an extremely close case." 817 P.2d at 784. The 
Utah Supreme Court was clearly troubled by the contradictions in 
the eyewitness's testimony, the cross-racial identification, and 
the witness's lack of opportunity to view the gunman's face. 
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Despite these concerns, the court in Ramirez deferred to the 
trial court's resolution of the factual inconsistencies and its 
ability to appraise demeanor evidence and upheld the 
identification. Id. at 784. 
The court in this case does not stand in the same 
position as the reviewing court in Ramirez because the trial 
court did not review the evidence, resolve conflicts in the 
evidence, make findings of fact, or make any meaningful legal 
determination whatsoever. The deference to the trial court 
relied upon in Ramirez is not applicable to this case. Absent 
that reliance on the trial court's ability to assess and weigh 
evidence, the court in this case cannot so easily dismiss the 
evidentiary problems surrounding this identification. See also 
State v. Perrv, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
As in Ramirez, the failure of the trial court to make 
findings of fact in this case amounts to prejudicial error. The 
State relied heavily on the showup identification at trial. 
R. 320-22. The in-court identification was not based upon 
reliable, independent observations and was tainted by the unduly 
suggestive showup procedure. There was no corroborating evidence 
connecting Appellant to the crime save a highly ambiguous remark 
Appellant made to the police that "Maybe Cody or Brad did 
something, but I didn't do anything." R. 345. Absent the 
identification, the State has no case against Appellant. The 
failure of the trial court to make the necessary factual and 
legal findings to determine the reliability of the identification 
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under the circumstances of this case warrants a reversal and 
orders for a new trial. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788-89. 
POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY. 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that 
Appellant intended the use of a deadly weapon in this case. 
Appellant was convicted as an accomplice to Aggravated Robbery-
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) . Section 76-6-302 
requires as an element of the offense that the actor use or 
threaten to use a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1995) states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
While no Utah case has directly addressed the issue of whether an 
accomplice to armed robbery must have knowledge that the 
principal will use a dangerous weapon, it has long been 
recognized that the defendant must specifically intend to bring 
about the commission of the offense. 
An accomplice is a person who knowingly, 
voluntarily, and with common intent with the 
principal offender, unites in the commission of 
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be 
real, not merely apparent. Mere presence 
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to 
be committed or a mental approbation while the 
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act, 
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice. 
State v. Fertiq, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951). While party 
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liability enables the law to hold a defendant criminally 
responsible for the actions of another, "the degree of his 
responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts 
that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state 
of the actor." State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983). 
Federal courts that have considered this issue have held 
that the accomplice must at least know that a weapon would be 
carried or used. United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 
(C.A. D.C. 1991). This standard puts the accomplice on the same 
level of culpability as the principal. JEd. Requiring knowledge 
that a weapon will be carried or used creates a reasonable and 
fair moral divide. If the defendant sets out on a project which 
she knows involves the use of a deadly weapon, she is equally 
blameworthy for its use. Id. Absent knowledge that a weapon 
will be used, the accomplice should not be equally punished for 
the principal's conduct. See also United States v. Dinkane, 17 
F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (government must show the 
defendant knew the principal had and intended to use a dangerous 
weapon in order to sustain a conviction of armed robbery). 
In Powell, the court held that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a firearms charge on a theory of 
accomplice liability where the defendant offered to sell an 
undercover police officer narcotics, and took him to the basement 
of an apartment where there were several other men, one of whom 
was holding a gun. 929 F.2d at 725. Likewise, in Dinkane, the 
court held there was insufficient evidence to support a 
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conviction of armed robbery against the getaway driver because 
the driver remained in the vehicle during the robbery, there was 
no evidence that use of a gun was discussed, the driver had no 
weapon, and there was no evidence that the guns used by the 
principals were visible until after they entered the bank. 17 
F.3d at 1197-98. 
In this case, the State presented no evidence that 
Appellant knew or had reason to know that the principal would use 
a knife.2 The knife was not in view prior to the time the woman 
told her companion to get her the shoes. R. 315. The man had 
the knife secured behind his back. R. 315. There is no evidence 
that it was visible prior to his pulling it out to threaten the 
victim. The woman did not use any words that would indicate that 
she knew the principal had a knife. Unlike a bank robbery, this 
is not the type of crime that normally entails use of a weapon. 
Also, unlike a robbery of a bank or store, this was not a planned 
crime, but appeared to be a spontaneous act in response to the 
victim's walking past the trio. There is no evidence that the 
2
. The following evidence was presented at trial regarding 
the use of the knife. A complete recitation of all the facts can 
be found in the Facts section of this brief: 
1. The woman was standing with two men, and they appeared 
to be together. R. 312-13. 
2. She asked one of the men to get the victim's shoes for 
her. R. 312-13. 
3. The man approached the victim, reached behind his back, 
and pulled out a knife. R. 315. 
4. The man with the knife was about three feet away from 
the woman. R. 315. 
5. The woman and second man were about four feet from the 
victim. R. 315. 
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woman approached the victim with the man. R. 315. The woman 
did not hand the knife to the principal, say anything about the 
knife, or chase the victim. R. 327-28. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
State failed to present any evidence to support the conclusion 
that Appellant knew or had any reason to know that a dangerous 
weapon would be used and is thus insufficient to support a 
conviction of Aggravated Robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court reverse her conviction and remand with orders for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this A<*J- day of June, 1997 
REBECCA C. HYDE ~/ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law . . . 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1995) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1995) 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
RULE 12, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing 
shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall 
state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised 
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at 
least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment 
or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 
9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or 
at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but 
the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be 
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the 
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, 
it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable and 
specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or 
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
